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PROFITING UNDER THE VEIL OF COMPENSATION:
WILLS V. FOSTER AND THE APPLICATION OF
THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE TO
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
INTRODUCTION
At first glance, compensation appears to be a relatively simple con-
cept. In fact, Merriam-Webster's dictionary defines compensation
simply as the act of "making up, making good, or counterbalancing."'
In many aspects of law, however, the concept of compensation is any-
thing but simple. For example, consider a hypothetical in which a neg-
ligent driver injures someone. If the injured person required surgery
that cost $100,000, how much money would be necessary to compen-
sate that party for her loss? In all likelihood, it would take exactly
$100,000 to compensate her for her medical expenses. However, if the
injured party was short on cash and her friend paid that $100,000 on
her behalf, how much money would she then seek in damages? In
that situation, one would assume that the injured party would need to
repay her friend, so $100,000 would remain the appropriate measure
of compensation. Now consider a more complex situation in which
the injured party's friend was a professional negotiator who convinced
the hospital to accept $50,000 as full payment for the surgery. If the
injured party then brought a personal injury suit against the negligent
driver, would the plaintiff's attorney advise her to seek $100,000,
$50,000, or $0 in compensatory damages?
This question presents some of the complicated issues associated
with the law of compensation. While the injured party technically
paid nothing out of her own pocket, her friend paid $50,000, and the
hospital received $50,000 less than what the surgery cost. So who
should receive compensation in this situation, and how much should
they receive?
The answer to this question directly relates to personal injury suits
involving plaintiffs whose medical expenses have been covered by
Medicare or Medicaid. In such cases, questions of compensation are
important because Medicare and Medicaid generally reimburse
healthcare providers with a significantly lower amount than that which
1. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNA-
BRIDGED 453 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1981).
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those providers charge for their services. 2 Like the hypothetical
friend-negotiator, Medicare and Medicaid provide hospitals with a
payment that is less than the amount hospitals charge. This payment
is treated as payment in full, which prevents the hospital from recov-
ering additional amounts from the injured party herself. Nonetheless,
such injured parties have generally been able to bring suits against
negligent third parties and recover the full amount charged by the
healthcare providers.
The Illinois appellate court in Wills v. Foster, however, limited such
recoveries. 3 The court's decision addressed a question that is relevant
to the compensation issues dealt with in this introduction-whether
the collateral source rule applies to Medicare and Medicaid benefits. 4
The collateral source rule is a rule of damages that prevents a
tortfeasor from submitting evidence to show that a plaintiff's expenses
were paid by an independent third party.5 Typically, the rule allows a
plaintiff to recover the full amount of expenses related to her injury
even though the plaintiff's insurer paid those expenses or a lesser
amount.6 In Wills, the appellate court held that the collateral source
rule does not apply to benefits paid by Medicare and Medicaid and,
therefore, plaintiffs covered by these programs are limited to recover-
ing the amount actually paid to the healthcare provider.7 The Illinois
Supreme Court then reversed the decision and held that the collateral
source rule applies to Medicare and Medicaid benefits; thus, under
this approach, payments from these programs-or the amounts writ-
ten off by the providers-do not reduce the plaintiff's recovery. 8
This Note analyzes the Wills case, describes its impact on damages
in Illinois, and explains why the Illinois Supreme Court erred in over-
turning the appellate decision. Part II of this Note provides back-
ground information on the law of damages, the development of the
collateral source rule, governmental healthcare, and subrogation
rights, and then examines different jurisdictional approaches to this
issue. 9 Part III examines the Wills case and provides a brief summary
of Arthur v. Catour, a previous Illinois Supreme Court decision inter-
2. TERRY S. COLEMAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICARE & MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT: PAY-
MENT FOR HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIAN SERVICES 21, 81 (Nat'l Health Lawyers Ass'n 1990).
3. 867 N.E.2d 1223, 1228 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), rev'd 892 N.E.2d 1018 (11. 2008).
4. Id.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (1979).
6. Id. cmt. c.
7. Wills, 867 N.E.2d at 1228.
8. Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1033-34 (Ill. 2008).
9. See infra notes 13-111 and accompanying text.
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preting the collateral source rule.' 0 Part IV discusses the implications
of the appellate and supreme court opinions in Wills and argues that
the Illinois Supreme Court erred in overturning the appellate deci-
sion.11 Finally, Part V contemplates the impact that the Illinois Su-
preme Court's ruling will have on personal injury cases in Illinois.12
II. BACKGROUND: DAMAGES, COLLATERAL SOURCES,
MEDICARE, AND MEDICAID
This Part provides an overview of the legal aspects of damages, col-
lateral sources, and governmental healthcare. Section A presents gen-
eral rules of damages for tort cases.13 Section B details the
development and application of the collateral source rule. 14 Section C
reviews the application of the collateral source rule in Illinois. 15 Sec-
tion D discusses Medicare and Medicaid, 16 and Section E discusses
subrogation. 17 Finally, Section F examines the different jurisdictional
approaches applying the collateral source rule to Medicare and
Medicaid.18
A. Damages in Torts
The issue of damages is a question of fact,19 and in tort law, there is
no exhaustive list of rules defining recoverability. 20 The law does not
specify every item to be recovered in any given case; rather, it at-
tempts to put the injured party in the position in which she would
have been had the injury not occurred. 2' Generally, courts allow a
plaintiff to recover "all damages that are the natural and proximate
result or consequence of a tort."' 22 Four basic purposes govern the
measure of damages in such cases: (1) compensation of the injured
10. See infra notes 112-172 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 173-238 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 239-250 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 19-32 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 69-84 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 85-111 and accompanying text.
19. Flynn v. Vancil, 242 N.E.2d 237, 240 (Ill. 1968).
20. Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Story, 63 I11. App. 239, 239-40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1896); MARC
A. FRANKLIN, INJURIES AND REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNA-
TIVES 416 (1971).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979).
22. MATTHEW BENDER, DAMAOES IN TORT ACTIONS § 1.01[3] (2008).
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party; (2) determination of the parties' rights; (3) punishment of
wrongdoers; and (4) deterrence of self-help.2 3
As the name suggests, compensatory damages are awarded to com-
pensate or indemnify the plaintiff for the harm she sustained.24 How-
ever, the law clearly provides that an award based on compensatory
damages should not provide the injured party with a profit from the
transaction; the amount awarded should be limited to that which is
required to compensate the party.25 A plaintiff's medical expenses are
an important aspect of compensatory damages. Courts consistently
recognize that reasonable and necessary medical expenses are recov-
erable as special compensatory damages.2 6 However, in order to re-
cover such expenses, "the plaintiff must prove that he or she has paid
or become liable to pay a medical bill, that he or she necessarily in-
curred the medical expenses because of injuries resulting from the de-
fendant's negligence, and that the charges were reasonable for
services of that nature. '27
Expert testimony is the most common method of proving the neces-
sity of medical expenses.28 However, the law is less clear as to what a
plaintiff must show to establish the reasonableness of those ex-
penses.29 Under the majority view, amounts paid or charged for medi-
cal expenses alone do not establish the reasonableness of such
expenses. 30  Under the minority view, the amount of the plaintiff's
medical bill is per se reasonable. 31 In Illinois, courts have adopted a
middle-ground approach by finding that a medical bill for treatment
rendered in response to a personal injury constitutes prima facie evi-
23. Id. § 1.01[21 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 904 (1979)).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979).
25. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 21 (2002). There are two types of compensatory damages: general
damages and special damages. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 904 (1979). General dam-
ages are those that are so frequently associated with the alleged tort that the plaintiff does not
have to prove the damages in order to recover. Id. In other words, when a tort is alleged, there
are certain damages that the court assumes exist. Id. cmt. a. Special damages encompass all
compensatory damages other than those considered general damages. Id. § 904[2].
26. BENDER, supra note 22, § 9.01.
27. Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 853 (I11. 2005).
28. BENDER, supra note 22, § 9.02.
29. Id. § 9.03[2][a] (describing the conflicting jurisdictional rules relating to whether the
amount paid or charged constitutes the reasonable value of services rendered).
30. Id. (showing that Alaska, Iowa, Maryland, North Carolina, and Texas represent the major-
ity view rejecting medical bills alone as sufficient evidence to establish reasonableness).
31. Id. (showing that Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Dakota, and Ohio fol-
low this approach).
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dence of the reasonableness of those charges, but only if the bill is
paid. 32
B. Collateral Payments and the Collateral Source Rule
The collateral source rule is often traced back to an 1854 United
States Supreme Court case, Propeller Monticello v. Mollison.33 Under
the collateral source rule, "benefits received by the injured party from
a source wholly independent of, and collateral to, the tortfeasor will
not diminish damages otherwise recoverable. '34 Payments made to
benefits or benefits conferred on a plaintiff by parties other than the
defendant-or by a party acting on behalf of the defendant-are
known as payments from collateral sources. 35 Although such pay-
ments may reduce the plaintiff's pecuniary losses, the collateral source
rule prevents any such reduction from affecting the defendant's liabil-
ity. 36 Thus, this rule allows a plaintiff to receive a compensatory re-
ward for medical expenses that exceeds the amount that she actually
incurred. 37
The intended purpose of the collateral source rule is to "protect[]
collateral payments made to or benefits conferred on the plaintiff by
denying the defendant any corresponding offset or credit."' 38 The rule
acts as both a rule of damages and a rule of evidence by preventing
the reduction of the plaintiff's recovery and precluding the defendant
from submitting evidence of collateral benefits. 39 One of the most fre-
quent applications of the rule occurs when an injured party is partly
32. Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 854 (justifying its holding of prima facie reasonableness by noting
that "[tihe premise is that a consumer will not willingly pay an unreasonable or unusual charge
for a service").
33. 58 U.S. 152 (1854); see Douglas Hill Schwartz, Comment, The Tortured Path of Ohio's
Collateral Source Rule, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 643, 643 (1997); Guillermo Gabriel Zorogastua, Com-
ment, Improperly Divorced from Its Roots: The Rationales of the Collateral Source Rule and
Their Implications for Medicare and Medicaid Write-Offs, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 463, 475-76
(2007).
34. Wilson v. Hoffman Group, 546 N.E.2d 524, 530 (Ill. 1989).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (1979).
36. Id. cmt. t. The comment explains:
The injured party's net loss may have been reduced correspondingly, and to the extent
that the defendant is required to pay the total amount there may be a double compen-
sation for a part of the plaintiff's injury. But it is the position of the law that a benefit
that is directed to the injured party should not be shifted so as to become a windfall for
the tortfeasor.
Id.; see also Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 851 ("Such collateral benefits do not reduce the defendant's
tort liability, even though they reduce the plaintiff's loss.").
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (1979); see also Zorogastua, supra
note 33, at 469-70.
38. Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 851.
39. Id. at 852.
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indemnified or covered for medical expenses pursuant to accident in-
surance.40 Although application of the rule may result in overcompen-
sation for the plaintiff-a result that is inconsistent with a strong
public policy in Illinois-the rule acts as an exception to the general
prohibition against excessive recoveries.41 Some courts justify this ex-
ception by noting that insurance companies generally have a subroga-
tion right against the plaintiff's award, which will prevent the plaintiff
from being overcompensated. 42 Other courts and authorities, how-
ever, simply take the position that it is better to side with the injured
party and allow the plaintiff to receive a windfall than to reduce the
defendant's liability.43
C. Development of the Collateral Source Rule in Illinois
The collateral source rule first appeared in Illinois in 1870, when the
Illinois Supreme Court decided the case of Pittsburg, Cincinnati & St.
Louis Railway Co. v. Thompson.44 The plaintiff in Thompson was
partially indemnified by his insurance carrier, but the court rejected
the defendant's argument that the plaintiff's reward should be re-
duced by the insurance payments.45 The court held that if such
amount was paid by the plaintiff's insurer, it did not pro tanto dis-
charge the defendant from liability for those expenses. 46 Since the
advent of the collateral source rule, courts have consistently applied it
to personal injury cases in which the plaintiff's medical expenses were
paid by her personal insurance carrier.47 The collateral source rule
has also been applied to other causes of action, including those for
40. Wilson v. Hoffman Group, 546 N.E.2d 524, 530 (I11. 1989).
41. Cress v. Recreation Servs., Inc., 795 N.E.2d 817, 860 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Hansen v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 723 N.E.2d 302, 315 (I11. App. Ct. 2000).
42. Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 67 (Cal. 1970).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (1979); Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d
61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958); Muranyi v. Turn Verien Frisch-Auf, 719 N.E.2d 366, 369 (111. App. Ct.
1999); Werner v. Lane, 393 A.2d 1329, 1335-36 (Me. 1978).
44. 56 I11. 138 (1870). In Thompson, a passenger who was injured as a result of the railroad's
negligence brought a personal injury action against the railroad to recover his expenses. Id. at
139. In response, the railroad argued that the amount of the passenger's expenses paid by his
accident insurance company should be set aside from the passenger's award. Id. at 143.
45. Id. at 143.
46. Id. The Thompson court did not refer to the plaintiff's insurance payments as "collateral
sources," and it appears that an Illinois court first adopted this term in 1904. See I11. Cent. Ry. v.
Prickett, 71 N.E. 435, 436 (I11. 1904) (holding that it was immaterial whether the decedent's
widow and next of kin were paid or entitled to receive money from a life-insurance policy be-
cause such benefit only accrued from a "collateral source").
47. See Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Ill. 2005); Wilson v. Hoffman Group, 546
N.E.2d 524, 530 (I11. 1989).
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wrongful death and dram-shop SUitS, 48 but Illinois courts have refused
to extend it to cases involving pecuniary losses not associated with
personal injuries.49
In Illinois, the most common justification for the collateral source
rule has been stated as the principle that the tortfeasor "should not
benefit from expenditures made by the injured party, or take advan-
tage of contracts or other relations which exist between the injured
party and third persons. '50 Because of this jurisdiction's focus on the
plaintiff's expenditures or contracts, Illinois courts have often refused
to apply the collateral source rule to situations in which the benefits
were conferred on the plaintiff without her having expended money
or entered into a contract to secure those benefits.5a As the Illinois
Supreme Court has stated, "the policy behind the collateral source
rule simply is not applicable if the plaintiff has incurred no expense,
obligation, or liability in obtaining the services for which he seeks
compensation. '52 Therefore, unlike courts in some jurisdictions, Illi-
nois courts have continued to focus on the plaintiff's expenditures and
actions to justify application of the rule.5 3
48. Legislatures in many jurisdictions have enacted statutes, commonly known as dram-shop
acts, which grant a right of action against parties that are responsible for serving intoxicants to
others who injure an innocent third party after consuming the intoxicants. 48A C.J.S. Intoxicat-
ing Liquors § 636 (2004).
49. Sterling Radio Stations, Inc. v. Weinstine, 765 N.E.2d 56, 61-62 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (hold-
ing that the collateral source rule is inapplicable to legal malpractice cases because it is limited to
situations involving personal injuries and does not apply to pecuniary losses for intangible
property).
50. Id. at 61; see also Lopez v. Morley, 817 N.E.2d 592, 598 (II1. App. Ct. 2004); Wilson, 546
N.E.2d at 530; First Midwest Trust Co. v. Rogers, 701 N.E.2d 1107, 1118 (Il1. App. Ct. 1998).
51. See Sycamore Preserve Works v. Chi. & Nw. Ry., 12 N.E.2d 42, 45-46 (I11. App. Ct. 1938)
(refusing to apply the collateral source rule to prevent a defendant from submitting evidence to
show that the plaintiff's damages were reduced when he salvaged damaged material); Peterson v.
Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 392 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Il1. 1979) (refusing to apply the collateral source
rule to allow plaintiff to recover the value of medical services rendered in response to a personal
injury because the services were provided to him at no charge), overruled by Wills v. Foster, 892
N.E.2d 1018 (Il. 2008); Jones & Adams, Co. v. George, 81 N.E. 4, 6 (IU1. 1907) (refusing to allow
plaintiff to recover the value of nursing services provided to him at no charge by his family). But
see Muranyi v. Turn Verien Frisch-Auf, 719 N.E.2d 366, 370-71 (Il. App. Ct. 1999) (distinguish-
ing Peterson from a situation in which all of the plaintiff's expenses were paid by her husband's
insurance carrier, applying collateral source rule to such payments, and noting that these benefits
are bargained for by the plaintiff, not gratuitous).
52. Peterson, 392 N.E.2d at 5.
53. See U.S. Can Co. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 626, 631-32 (7th Cir. 2001); Arthur v. Catour, 833
N.E.2d 847, 852 (Il. 2005) (providing an example of Illinois's emphasis on plaintiff's expendi-
tures to secure benefits); see also Zorogastua, supra note 33, at 476-77 (discussing the Kansas
collateral source rule).
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D. Medicare and Medicaid
In Wills, the courts' opinions were influenced by the specific type of
collateral sources involved, Medicare and Medicaid benefits.5 4 In or-
der to accurately understand and analyze these opinions, one must
briefly consider the procedural and administrative processes of these
two programs. Although Medicaid programs may vary from state to
state, this Section provides a broad overview of the general character-
istics of these programs. Medicare and Medicaid are government-
funded programs intended to help pay the medical expenses of elderly
and low-income individuals who receive care from non-government
healthcare providers.5 5 Medicare is funded entirely by the federal
government.5 6 In contrast, Medicaid is a federal-state program, under
which a state can implement a healthcare program, and if that pro-
gram complies with certain federal regulations, the federal govern-
ment will match state expenditures to help cover the beneficiaries'
expenses.5 7
Medicare is comprised of four parts, each of which provides a sepa-
rate form of assistance. 58 Part A provides assistance for inpatient hos-
pital care, nursing facility services, home healthcare, and hospice
services.5 9 Part B provides supplementary medical insurance prima-
rily for outpatient care.60 Part C essentially comprises benefits similar
to those provided in Part A, B, and D, but it is managed by private
insurance companies.61 Part D is limited to coverage for prescription
drug costs. 62 All individuals sixty-five years of age or older who qual-
ify for Social Security benefits automatically qualify for Medicare Part
A.63 While Part A recipients are not required to pay monthly premi-
ums in order to receive Medicare benefits, beneficiaries for Parts B
and C are required to make monthly payments in order to receive
assistance. 64
Under the Illinois Public Aid Code, which is administered by the
Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services (Illinois De-
54. Wills v. Foster, 867 N.E.2d 1223, 1227-28 (Il. App. Ct. 2007), rev'd, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1033
(111. 2008).
55. COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 1.
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id.
58. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE AND You 2009, at 12
(2008), available at http://www.medicare.gov/publications/pubs/pdfI10050.pdf.
59. COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 2.
60. Id.
61. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, supra note 58, at 12, 43.
62. Id.
63. COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 2.
64. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, supra note 58, at 43.
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partment or Department), the state of Illinois provides assistance to
certain classes of individuals, including persons aged sixty five or
older, blind persons, and adults with qualifying disabilities. 65 When
determining eligibility for assistance, the Department may consider
the recipient's available income. 66 The Illinois program does not re-
quire beneficiaries to make monthly premium payments to receive as-
sistance. 67 However, in the event of an injury, the Department may
obtain a lien on the recipient's property, and if a beneficiary receives
an award from a negligent third party who caused the recipient's inju-
ries, the Department may require the recipient to reimburse the state
for the expenditures it made on her behalf.68
E. Subrogation
One issue that courts and scholars commonly focus on when consid-
ering the collateral source rule is a third-party payor's right to subro-
gation.69 The extent to which the entity that actually makes the
collateral source payments can recover for its expenditures may have
a substantial effect on the plaintiff's recovery. The right of subroga-
tion generally derives from a contract between an insurer and an in-
sured. 70 Through subrogation, an insurer will generally have a right
against any recovery the insured may receive from a third party whose
negligence caused the insured's injury.7' A subrogation right allows
the insurer to receive compensation for the payments it made on the
insured's behalf by recovering those expenses from any settlement or
judgment the insured is awarded from a personal injury suit against a
third party.7 2
Under the federal Medicare statute, if a beneficiary brings a per-
sonal injury suit against a third party whose negligence caused the
beneficiary's injuries, the government automatically has a subrogation
65. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-1 (2004).
66. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-1.
67. See id. (detailing eligibility requirements for general assistance under Illinois Medicaid).
When a person qualifies for assistance under the Illinois Code, the state will grant either a
"money payment," which is made directly to the recipient, or a "vendor payment," which is
made directly to the service provider on behalf of the beneficiary. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-3, -
5.
68. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-22A (providing Illinois with a subrogation right to the extent of
amounts paid on behalf of the beneficiary for assistance under this Code); 305 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/3-10 (providing Illinois with lien rights on a beneficiary's property to the extent of amounts
paid for assistance on behalf of beneficiary).
69. Zorogastua, supra note 33, at 469-70.
70. 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1993 (2007); see also GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSUR-
ANCE LAW § 61:2-61:3 (2d ed. 1983).
71. COUCH, supra note 70, § 61:1.
72. 44A AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1785 (2003).
2009]
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right to the beneficiary's recovery. 73 This right allows the government
to recover the expenditures it made on the injured party's behalf.74 In
the case of Medicaid, the state and federal governments that paid the
beneficiary's expenses possess a similar subrogation right.75 Though
the government is entitled to compensation for its Medicare or Medi-
caid payments, the hospitals that actually provide services to the in-
jured parties do not have a similar right. 76 The healthcare provider
that receives the Medicare or Medicaid payments must accept the
amount of those payments as payment in full, and that healthcare pro-
vider is precluded from pursuing any additional amounts from the
beneficiary. 77 Therefore, when a personal injury plaintiff is a Medi-
care or Medicaid recipient, her recovery may be subject to subroga-
tion by the federal or state government for the amount those entities
paid on the plaintiff's behalf. The plaintiff's recovery, however, will
not be reduced by any claim from the healthcare provider that is re-
quired to accept the government's payment as payment in full-a pay-
ment which may or may not fully compensate the provider for its
costs. 78 Thus, if the provider does not have a subrogation right against
a plaintiff's recovery from a third party, the plaintiff could potentially
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(y)(b)(2)(B)(iii) (2000) ("The United States shall be subrogated to the
extent of payment made under this subchapter for such an item or service to any right under this
subsection of an individual or any other entity to payment with respect to such item or service
under a primary plan.").
74. Id.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(25)(A)-(C); 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-22A (2004) (providing that
the Department shall be subrogated to the extent of the amount of medical assistance the De-
partment provides to a beneficiary who receives payments from a third party for its expenses).
76. See 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13 (stating that acceptance of the government payment by
or on behalf of the hospital bars that hospital from "obtaining, or attempting to obtain, addi-
tional payment therefore from the recipient or any other person"); Holle v. Moline Pub. Hosp.,
598 F. Supp. 1017, 1019 (C.D. I11. 1984) (holding that a hospital that participates in the Medicare
program agrees not to charge individuals for services rendered and, therefore, the "hospital may
not file a lien for amounts that represent charges for covered services for which Medicare has
been billed by the provider, except for deductible or co-insurance amounts"); Methodist Med.
Ctr. v. Ingram, 413 N.E.2d 402, 408 (Il1. 1980) (holding that 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/22-13 does
not deprive hospitals of property without due process of law).
77. Id.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(25)(A)-(C) (providing the federal government with a similar subroga-
tion right against the beneficiary's recovery from a third party); 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-22A
(providing that the Department shall be subrogated to the extent of the amount of medical
assistance the Department provides to a beneficiary who receives payments from a third party
for its expenses); 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13 (providing that the hospital's acceptance of the
payment bars it from attempting to obtain additional payments from other parties); COLEMAN,
supra note 2, at 21 ("In concept, the prospective payment system (PPS) is intended to pay a
hospital a predetermind fee for treating each Medicare patient equal to the average cost of
treating a patient with the condition involved.... Hospitals that are more efficient than average
can profit and those that are less efficient will incur losses under PPS.").
WILLS V. FOSTER
receive an award of compensatory damages for expenses that were
never paid by any party.79
A similar result could arise in a case involving collateral source pay-
ments from a private insurance company if a healthcare provider were
to accept a lesser amount from the carrier as payment in full.80 How-
ever, the key distinction between private insurance claims and those
involving Medicare and Medicaid lies in the freedom of contract. 81 If
a healthcare provider were to enter into an agreement with an insur-
ance company to accept a lesser payment from that carrier as payment
in full, the provider could still presumably reserve its potential subro-
gation right in the event of a negligence suit.8 2 If the provider failed
to reserve this right or expressly waived it, then that decision would be
one that the provider entered into freely. The provider therefore
would assume responsibility for not receiving full compensation for its
services.
In contrast, the law forbids government-funded healthcare provid-
ers from reserving or waiving any rights to subrogation.8 3 In these
government funded programs, the government imposes its will on
healthcare providers by mandating that they waive their rights to sub-
rogation and accept a lower amount as payment in full.8 4 In order for
the situation with these government-funded programs to be analogous
to that of private insurance, the private insurance carrier would have
to be able to require the healthcare provider to accept its $50,000 pay-
ment as payment in full for the injured party's $100,000 bill. In addi-
tion, it would also have to require the provider to waive all potential
subrogation rights. If the parties have equal bargaining power, it is
hard to imagine how an insurer could convince a provider to both
accept a lesser amount as payment in full and completely waive its
right to subrogation. As a matter of contract law, surely it would not
79. See 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13; see also Zorogastua, supra note 33, at 469-70.
80. See Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847 (111. 2005) (allowing the plaintiff to recover "reason-
able value" of medical services received even though that amount could exceed the discounted
price paid by plaintiff's private insurance company).
81. See COUCH, supra note 70, § 61:2-3.
82. See id. (discussing, in general, subrogation rights of insurers). A subrogation right created
by contract is referred to as "conventional subrogation," and it is clear that parties are allowed to
include these rights in their policies. See id. A subrogation right created by contract as opposed
to statute may have significance because the right granted by the contract may be broader than
those in the statute.
83. See 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13 (stating that acceptance of the government payment by
or on behalf of the hospital bars the hospital from pursuing additional amounts from the benefi-
ciary or negligent third party responsible for the injury); Holle v. Moline Pub. Hosp., 598 F.
Supp. 1017, 1019 (C.D. Il1. 1984).
84. See 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13.
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be difficult for the provider to retain its rights to recover from a judg-
ment against a third party, especially when considering that the
amount-the write-off amount-is something that the insurer will not
be able to recover itself. Therefore, the particular situation with gov-
ernment-funded programs, which includes mandated acceptance of
lower fees and waiver of subrogation rights, is not analogous to situa-
tions involving free negotiating between private insurance carriers and
hospitals.
F. Jurisdictional Approaches to the Application of the Collateral
Source Rule to Medicare and Medicaid
When the Illinois Appellate Court addressed the applicability of the
collateral source rule to Medicare and Medicaid in Wills, the issue was
one of first impression. 85 However, many other jurisdictions had al-
ready addressed this issue.86 In general, courts have dealt with this
issue in one of three ways: (1) holding that the collateral source rule
applies to Medicare and Medicaid in the same manner that it does to
private insurance benefits; (2) holding that the collateral source rule
does not apply to Medicare and Medicaid; or (3) applying a middle-
ground approach in which evidence of the benefits is admissible, but
the plaintiff can still recover the reasonable value of the medical
services. 87
In addition to these three common law approaches, legislatures in
states such as California, Connecticut, Minnesota, Iowa, Michigan,
and Rhode Island have created statutory collateral source rules that
determine how the courts deal with Medicare and Medicaid pay-
ments.88 In all of these states, the legislatures have enacted laws that
abrogate or change the common law application of the collateral
85. See Wills v. Foster, 867 N.E.2d 1223, 1227 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), rev'd, 892 N.E.2d 1018 (I11.
2008).
86. See infra notes 87, 88, 91 and accompanying text.
87. See Dyet v. McKinley, 81 P.3d 1236 (Idaho 2003) (holding that the collateral source rule
does not apply to Medicare payments and the plaintiff is limited to recovering amount paid by
government); Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So. 2d 611 (Miss. 2002) (holding that the
collateral source rule applies to Medicaid in the same manner as it does to private insurance
payments); Haselden v. Davis, 579 S.E.2d 293 (S.C. 2003) (holding that both the amount paid by
Medicaid and the amount the physician billed are admissible as evidence, and the plaintiff is
entitled to recover reasonable value of services rendered).
88. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.1 (West 2000); IOWA CODE § 147.136 (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.6303(1). (4) (2000); MINN. STAT. § 548.36 (2000). See also Zhuta v. Zhuta, No.
CV0440182768S, 2007 WL 2363387 (Conn. July 27, 2007) (analyzing the applicability of the state
collateral source rule statute to Medicare and Medicaid); Esposito v. O'Hair, 886 A.2d 1197 (R.I.
2005) (discussing the Rhode Island legislative approaches to collateral source rule).
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source rule to benefits such as Medicare and Medicaid.8 9 However, in
California, Iowa, and Rhode Island, the statutes only change the com-
mon law approach of the collateral source rule with respect to medical
malpractice cases, so that a healthcare provider whose negligence
causes a plaintiff's personal injury is provided with an offset in dam-
ages for any amount of the plaintiff's expenses that were paid not only
by Medicare and Medicaid, but by private insurance as well.90 In
Michigan, Minnesota, and Connecticut, however, lawmakers have en-
acted legislation that abrogates the common law collateral source rule
for all personal injury cases, not just medical malpractice. 91
A careful reading of these statutes provides insight into the issue of
the collateral source rule and government-funded healthcare. Specifi-
cally, the statutes recognize an important distinction between collat-
eral source payments for which the payer has a subrogation right, and
those in which it does not.92 Although this Note focuses only on the
common law approaches to the application of the collateral source
rule to Medicare and Medicaid, these statutes provide a clear example
of legislatures that have recognized that the public policy of opposing
excessive damages is more persuasive than any policy supporting the
collateral source rule.93 The following Subsections explore the com-
89. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1; IOWA CODE § 147.136; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6303(1),
(4); MINN. STAT. § 548.36.
90. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1; IOWA CODE § 147.136; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-34.1 (1997).
These states' statutes are less relevant with respect to the issue involved in this Note, because
they likely represent a legislative movement to limit medical malpractice cases rather than a
movement away from the collateral source rule in general. See generally AM. BAR FOUND.,
TORT REFORM AND RELATED PROPOSALS: ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHIES ON PRODUCT LIABIL-
ITY AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1979).
91. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 600.6303 (providing that evidence of collateral source payments
in conjunction with a personal injury suit is admissible after a verdict for the plaintiff but before
judgment is entered: "[I]f the court determines that all or part of the plaintiff's expense or loss
has been paid or is payable by a collateral source, the court shall reduce that portion of the
judgment which represents damages paid or payable by a collateral source ...."): MINN. STAT.
§ 548.36 (providing that "when liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact, and
when damages include an award to compensate the plaintiff for losses available to the date of
the verdict by collateral sources," the defendant may file a motion requiring both parties to
submit evidence of collateral source payments, and the court is required to reduce the damages
by any amounts paid by a collateral source that does not have a subrogation right against the
plaintiff's award); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-225 (2005) (requiring courts to receive evidence of
collateral source payments received by the plaintiff from all appropriate parties and to decrease
the plaintiff's award by such collateral payments except those for which the payer has a subroga-
tion right against the plaintiff's award).
92. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 548.36.
93. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW § 10.3.6 (1987) (explain-
ing that the difference between jurisdictional approaches to applying or not applying collateral
source rule may depend on whether it matters more to the jurisdiction to deter negligent conduct
or avoid overcompensation).
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mon law approaches to the application of the collateral source rule to
Medicare and Medicaid.
1. Collateral Source Rule Applies to Medicare and Medicaid
Courts in at least fifteen states have held that the collateral source
rule applies to Medicare and Medicaid in the same manner that it
does to private insurance. 94 In these jurisdictions, a defendant may
not submit evidence to show that the plaintiff's medical expenses were
paid by Medicare or Medicaid, and the plaintiff's recovery is not re-
duced by the amount of the payments or write-offs. 95 These courts
generally note that "[t]he tortfeasor who is legally responsible for
causing injury is not relieved of his obligation to the victim simply
because the victim had foresight to arrange, or good fortune to re-
ceive, benefits from a collateral source for injuries and expenses. '96
The justification for this approach relies both on general principles of
deterrence and the policy of favoring an injured party over a wrong-
doer in the event that one is to receive a windfall. 97
2. Collateral Source Rule Does Not Apply to Medicaid and
Medicare
Prior to the Illinois Appellate Court's decision in Wills, courts in
seven states concluded that the collateral source rule does not apply to
Medicare and Medicaid in the same manner that it does to private
insurance. 98 Under the view adopted by these courts, a defendant is
allowed to submit evidence to show that the plaintiff's bills were
94. See Pipkins v. TA Operating Corp., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (D.N.M. 2006); Dolgen Corp. v.
Hanks, 706 So. 2d 1240 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997); Powell v. Brady, 496 P.2d 328 (Colo. Ct. App.
1972); Pardee v. Suburban Propane, L.P., No. Civ.A. 98C-12-206RRC, 2003 WL 21213413 (Del.
Super. Ct. May 22, 2003); Candler Hosp. Corp. v. Dent, 491 S.E.2d 868 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997);
Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676 (Ky. 2005); Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Brad-
shaw, 809 So. 2d 611 (Miss. 2001); Porter v. Toys 'R' Us-Delaware, 152 S.W.3d 310 (Mo. Ct. App.
2004); Fickle v. State, 735 N.W.2d 754 (Neb. 2007); Cates v. Wilson, 361 S.E.2d 734 (N.C. 1987);
Handy v. City of Lawton, 835 P.2d 870 (Okla. 1992); Papke v. Harbert, 738 N.W.2d 510 (S.D.
2007); Coffey v. Noll, Nos. 01A01-9712-CV-00709, 96C-321, 1999 WL 20778 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan.
20, 1999); Dodd v. Lang, No. CL02000760-00, 2006 WL 2257160 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 29, 2006);
Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 611 N.W.2d 764 (Wis. 2000).
95. See, e.g., Pipkins, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1261-62.
96. Ellsworth, 611 N.W.2d at 767 (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. See Loncar v. Gray, 28 P.3d 928 (Alaska 2001); Coop. Leasing, Inc. v. Johnson, 872 So. 2d
956 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Dyet v. McKinley, 81 P.3d 1236 (Idaho 2003); Bates v. Hogg, 921
P.2d 249 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (superseded by statute); Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 692 (La.
2004); Kastick v. U-Haul Co., 740 N.Y.S.2d 167 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Moorhead v. Crozer
Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786 (Pa. 2001).
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paid-or partially written off-by Medicare, Medicaid, or both.99
Rather than allowing a plaintiff to recover the amount of her medical
care, plaintiffs whose expenses are paid and partially written off by
Medicare and Medicaid-not private insurance-are limited to recov-
ering the amount the government actually paid.100
These courts do not argue that the collateral source rule should be
abolished; rather, they distinguish Medicare and Medicaid from those
types of collateral sources that generally fall under the rule.10 1 One
court explained that Medicare and Medicaid write-offs, although not
technically collateral sources, are not an "item of damages for which
[the] plaintiff may recover because [the] plaintiff has incurred no lia-
bility therefore."'01 2 These courts generally refer to the purpose of
compensatory damages and note that a plaintiff should not be allowed
to recover the cost of medical bills when she did not incur any ex-
pense, obligation, or liability in relation to those charges.10 3
In contrast, those plaintiffs whose expenses are paid by their private
insurance carriers are allowed to recover the full amount charged by
the hospital, even if that amount is in excess of the amount paid, be-
cause those plaintiffs have incurred obligations or expenses-gener-
ally in the form of monthly premium charges-in order to receive
their benefits. 10 4 Perhaps, in the view adopted by these courts, the
plaintiffs' recoveries in such cases are not contrary to the public policy
against overcompensation because the plaintiffs have incurred ex-
penses and contracted to receive such benefits.105
3. Reasonableness Approach
Courts in at least five jurisdictions have taken a middle-ground ap-
proach to the application of the collateral source rule's applicability to
Medicare and Medicaid. 10 6 This approach differentiates the eviden-
tiary and damage aspects of the collateral source rule by rendering the
evidence of Medicare and Medicaid amounts admissible, while deny-
ing an automatic limitation of the plaintiff's recovery to such
99. See, e.g., Bozeman, 879 So. 2d at 703-04.
100. See, e.g., Dyet, 81 P.3d at 1239.
101. See, e.g., id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Coop. Leasing, 872 So. 2d at 958.
104. See Bozeman, 879 So. 2d at 703-04.
105. See id.
106. See Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 129 P.3d 487 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); Bynum v. Magno,
101 P.3d 1149 (Haw. 2004); Robinson v. Bates, 828 N.E.2d 657 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); Haselden
v. Davis, 579 S.E.2d 293 (S.C. 2004); Wong v. Graham, No. 03-00-00440-CV, 2001 WL 123932
(Tex. App. Feb. 15, 2001).
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amounts.10 7 Under this approach, the plaintiff is entitled to recover
the reasonable value of the medical services she received as a result of
the defendant's negligence.1 08 The plaintiff bears the burden of estab-
lishing the reasonableness of the expenses she incurred, and the hospi-
tal bills and amounts paid by Medicare, Medicaid, or both are
admissible to establish that amount.10 9
Many jurisdictions have adopted different approaches to the appli-
cation of the collateral source rule to Medicare and Medicaid. 10 The
three approaches discussed in this Section are distinguished by and
based on policy decisions relating to damages, specifically compensa-
tion and subrogation. In some jurisdictions, courts favor the public
policy opposing double recoveries, while in other jurisdictions, courts
attempt to ensure that negligent parties bear the full responsibility-
in the form of damages paid to the plaintiff-for their conduct."'
III. SUBJECT OPINION: WILLS V. FOSTER
In 2007, the Illinois Appellate Court considered whether the collat-
eral source rule applies to payments from Medicare and Medicaid. 112
As a matter of first impression, the court held that the collateral
source rule does not apply to these benefits and, therefore, the court
limited the plaintiff's recovery to the amount actually paid to the med-
ical provider. 13 In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court al-
igned Illinois with states such as Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Alaska,
New York, Kansas, and Pennsylvania, all of which have held that the
collateral source rule does not apply to Medicare and Medicaid.1 14
Thereafter, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's
decision, holding that the collateral source rule applies to Medicare
and Medicaid in the same manner as it does to private insurance.' 1 5
107. See, e.g., Haselden, 579 8.E.2d at 295.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 19-84 and accompanying text.
111. See Dyet v. McKinley, 81 P.3d 1236 (Idaho 2003) (limiting plaintiff's recovery to amount
paid by Medicare and Medicaid, refusing to allow potential double recovery in light of amounts
written off by hospital and never actually paid); Haselden, 579 S.E.2d at 295 (finding that al-
lowing plaintiff to recover reasonable value of expenses incurred ensures more accurate, consis-
tent results); SHAVELL, supra note 93, § 10.3.6 (providing that this determination often amounts
to a policy decision, which requires the court or legislature to choose whether it prefers deterring
negligent conduct more than avoiding overcompensation).
112. See Wills v. Foster, 867 N.E.2d 1223 (I1. App. Ct. 2007), rev'd, 892 N.E.2d 1018 (I11.
2008).
113. Id. at 1228.
114. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
115. Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1034 (Ill. 2008).
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In this case, Sheila Wills and two passengers were injured in an au-
tomobile accident when the defendant, Inman Foster, drove through a
red light and struck Wills's vehicle.116 As a result of this accident,
Wills aggravated a preexisting back injury and had to undergo surgery
for a spinal-cord fusion.117 The medical expenses for Wills's injuries
totaled $80,163.47.118 At the time Wills received care for her injuries,
she was a beneficiary of Medicare and Illinois Medicaid. 119 In satis-
faction for the services Wills received, these programs paid the health-
care provider a total of $19,005.05.120 The provider essentially wrote
off the difference between these amounts. 12'
Following the automobile accident, Wills filed a personal injury suit
against Foster, and both individuals filed motions in limine regarding
Wills's medical expenses. 122 Foster argued that Wills should be pre-
vented from submitting evidence of medical expenses in excess of the
amount paid by the government programs, and Wills motioned for the
court to deny the defendant's attempts to submit evidence of those
amounts. 123 The trial court granted Wills's motion, which allowed the
jury to consider the full monetary value of the medical treatment. 124
The jury returned a verdict for Wills, but the trial court later granted
Foster's post-trial motion to reduce the medical damages from the full
amount billed, $80,163.47, to the amount paid by the government pro-
grams, $19,005.05.125
Wills subsequently appealed that determination and argued that the
trial court erred in reducing her damages.126 In support of this posi-
tion, she argued that the trial court's conclusion was inconsistent with
the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Arthur v. Catour.127 On ap-
peal, Foster argued that the trial court correctly reduced Wills's dam-
ages and that the case was distinguishable from Arthur.128 The
majority of the appellate court's opinion focused on the Arthur case
and its implications for the current issue.129
116. Wills, 867 N.E.2d at 1224.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Zorogastua, supra note 33, at 468-70.
122. Wills, 867 N.E.2d at 1224.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1225.
127. Id.; see Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847 (Il. 2005).
128. Wills, 867 N.E.2d at 1225.
129. See id. at 1225-29.
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In Arthur, an invitee brought a personal injury suit against the de-
fendant landowner for injuries she sustained when she stepped in a
hole in the defendant's yard.130 The plaintiff sought to recover
$19,355.25 for medical treatment she received as a result of her inju-
ries.131 The plaintiff's medical insurer, however, paid only $13,577.97
in full satisfaction of the services the plaintiff received. 132 The trial
court held that the plaintiff could not recover more than the amount
paid by her insurer, but the appellate court reversed and held that the
plaintiff's damages were not limited to that amount.1 33 In its opinion
in Arthur, the Illinois Supreme Court discussed the policy reasons sup-
porting the collateral source rule and then held that the plaintiff was
not limited to recovering the amount paid by her insurer. 34 The court
referred to general damage principles and held that the plaintiff was
entitled to recover the reasonable value of the medical services she
received in connection with her personal injury.' 35 The court rea-
soned that the discount for the services occurred as a result of the
plaintiff's actions in securing insurance and therefore found that she
should be allowed to recover the full amount billed for the services-
the benefit of her bargain. 36
After analyzing the Arthur case, the appellate court in Wills noted
that Arthur only addressed the issue of discounts associated with a
plaintiff's private insurance. 37 In addition, the court stated that Ar-
thur did not address the previous decision of Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt
Chevrolet Co.'38 In Peterson, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff could not recover for expenses without incurring liability
therefor.139 The Wills appellate court stated that "[i]n effect, the Ar-
thur holding created ... a windfall in favor of the plaintiff," and be-
cause the Arthur court failed to overrule Peterson, the court applied
the Peterson ruling to its case.140 In doing so, the court held that Wills
was limited to recovering the amount actually paid by Medicare and
130. Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 849-50. "Invitee" is a termed used in premises liability to define a
certain type or class of visitors. 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 452 (2000).
131. Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 850.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 853-54.
135. Id. at 853.
136. Id. at 853.
137. Wills v. Foster, 867 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (Il. App. Ct. 2007), rev'd, 892 N.E.2d 1018 (Ill.
2008).
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet, Co., 392 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1979)).
140. Id. at 1227.
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Medicaid for her medical expenses. 141 Like the plaintiff in Peterson,
Wills did not incur expenses or bargain for the benefits she received;
she was simply a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the
government and her healthcare provider. 142 The court concluded that
the plaintiff could not recover in excess of the amount paid because
she never became liable for those expenses, never paid any premiums
or similar payments to secure those benefits, and did not bargain for
the discount provided to her by the government contracts.143
After the appellate court affirmed Wills, the Illinois Supreme Court
reversed the lower court's ruling.144 The Illinois Supreme Court
framed the issue on appeal as "whether the trial court erred in reduc-
ing the jury's award of medical expenses to the amount actually paid
by Medicaid and Medicare in full settlement of the bills."'1 45 In its
opinion, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted an approach whereby the
plaintiff is allowed to recover the reasonable value of her medical ex-
penses regardless of whether those expenses were paid by another
party, only paid in part pursuant to governmental programs, or never
charged at all. 146 Thus, a plaintiff can recover the reasonable value of
medical services provided to her free of charge.' 47 For this latter rea-
141. Id. at 1228.
142. Id.
143. Wills, 867 N.E.2d. at 1227-28. One dissenting justice on the appellate panel for Wills,
Justice Cook, disagreed that the Peterson case prevented the plaintiff from recovering more than
the amount paid by Medicare and Medicaid. See id. at 1228-29 (Cook, J., dissenting). Justice
Cook distinguished Peterson by arguing that the plaintiff in Peterson was not analogous to the
plaintiff in Wills because one received gratuitous medical care from a philanthropic third party,
while the other simply had her healthcare paid for by the government because she could not
afford private insurance. Id. Justice Cook stated that "[a] Medicare or Medicaid recipient is not
the lucky receiver of the generosity of some benevolent third party, but rather a needy person
who did not have the ability or resources to acquire private insurance." Id. at 1229. In Justice
Cook's view, whether a plaintiff who receives medical treatment free of charge can recover the
value of that treatment depends on whether the plaintiff is lucky or poor. If a plaintiff simply
received care from a benevolent doctor who happened to be at the right place at the right time,
the plaintiff does not have compensatory damages in the form of medical expenses. However, if
a plaintiff receives medical care at a hospital, and her services are paid at no cost to her, she
nonetheless has compensatory damages for those expenses. Justice Cook failed to support his
argument with case law, and his distinction between lucky and poor does not seem to be sup-
ported by the majority of Illinois cases addressing the collateral source rule. See, e.g., Arthur v.
Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 850-54 (11. 2005) (discussing general background of collateral source
rule in Illinois). Because Justice Cook's argument is less inclusive than the Illinois Supreme
Court's opinion, this Note focuses on the latter.
144. Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1034 (II. 2008).
145. Id. at 1020.
146. See id. at 1029-31.
147. Id.
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son, Peterson was inconsistent with Wills and, therefore, was
overruled. 148
In deciding the Wills case, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized
the inconsistencies in Illinois case law regarding the collateral source
rule, discussed the rule's origins and justifications, and adopted an ap-
proach that allows plaintiffs to recover the full amount billed for med-
ical services. 149 The Illinois Supreme Court began its discussion with
an overview of the collateral source rule, noting that "[p]ayments
made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources
are not credited against the tortfeasor's liability, although they cover
all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable."'1 50 The
court recognized that the collateral source rule is inconsistent with the
compensatory nature of these damages, but it stated that the rule is an
"established exception to the general rule that damages in negligence
actions must be compensatory." 151
After providing a brief overview of the collateral source rule, the
court questioned whether Peterson survived Arthur.152 The court re-
viewed the three approaches identified by different jurisdictions ad-
dressing the application of the collateral source rule to Medicare and
Medicaid. 153 The court's discussion focused heavily on the different
sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that relate to the collat-
eral source rule and compensatory damages. 54 The court noted that
the cases that limit the application of the collateral source rule and
restrict the amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff tend to
focus on sections of the Restatement that explain the general require-
148. Id. at 1031.
149. Id. at 1022-34.
150. See Wills, 892 N.E.2d at 1022-25 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2)
(1979)).
151. Id. (quoting 25 C.J.S. Damages § 172 (2002)).
152. Id. at 1023-31.
153. Id. (noting three general approaches to the issue of the collateral source rules applicabil-
ity to Medicare and Medicaid). The court termed these three approaches "(1) actual amount
paid; (2) benefit of the bargain and (3) reasonable value." Id. These names differ somewhat
from how the approaches were termed in this Note, but the substance of each approach is simi-
lar. Under the court's view of the "actual amount paid" approach, plaintiffs are limited to recov-
ering the amount actually paid by government. Id. at 1025-26. Under the benefit-of-the-bargain
approach, plaintiffs who actually pay or bargain for their insurance are allowed to recover the
full amount billed while those who receive coverage free of charge are limited to the amount
paid, which draws a distinction between private insurance and governmental healthcare or gratu-
itously provided services. Id. at 1026-27. The reasonable-value approach allows plaintiffs to
recover the reasonable value of health services, but the court distinguishes between jurisdictions
that allow the actual amount paid to be admissible as evidence of reasonableness. Id. at
1027-29.
154. Id. at 1025-29.
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ments of compensatory damages.155 In contrast, those courts that ap-
ply the collateral source rule to Medicare and Medicaid benefits to its
full extent focus on sections of the Restatement, 156 which arguably
support the full application of the collateral source rule to these gov-
ernmental healthcare benefits. 157 Thus, the court overruled Peterson
and expressly adopted the "reasonable value approach," which allows
plaintiffs to recover the reasonable value of their medical expenses
and prohibits defendants from submitting evidence of the amounts
paid by Medicare and Medicaid in an attempt to establish a lower
recovery. 158  Furthermore, consistent with Illinois law-which
prescribes that a medical bill is only prima facie reasonable if it is paid
in full-the court held that plaintiffs cannot rely on the bill itself to
establish the reasonable value of their expenses.159 The plaintiff must
present additional testimony or evidence to establish the reasonable-
ness of the amount charged.' 60
The court provided four reasons for adopting its version of the rea-
sonable-value approach. 61 Two of these justifications relate only to
persuasive support for the adopted rule and do little to help determine
how the underlying principles of compensation and the collateral
source rule apply to this situation. 62 A third justification is based on
criticisms of the benefit-of-the-bargain approach. 63 The court stated
that an approach that would only allow a plaintiff to recover the full
amount billed if she had bargained for or incurred some expense to
secure her insurance coverage undermines the collateral source rule
itself.164 In the court's view, this approach would unfairly distinguish
between plaintiffs and is in contrast to the general principle that "[t]he
collateral source rule ensures that the liability for similarly situated
defendants is not dependent on the relative fortuity of the manner in
which each plaintiff's medical expenses are financed.' 65
155. Id. at 1027-28.
156. See id. at 1028-29.
157. See Wills, 892 N.E.2d at 1028-29.
158. Id. at 1031.
159. Id. at 1033-34.
160. Id. at 1033.
161. Id. at 1030-31.
162. See id. (noting that two justifications for the adoption of this rule were the support found
in the comments section of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A and the cases from other
jurisdictions that have adopted the rule).
163. Wills, 892 N.E.2d at 1030-31.
164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 736 N.W.2d 1, 10 (2007)).
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Finally, the court noted that the rule provided in Arthur was meant
to cover situations involving Medicare and Medicaid. 166 In discussing
the policy justifications for the rule, the court stated that "the wrong-
doer should not benefit from the expenditures made by the injured
party or take advantage of contracts or other relations that may exist
between the injured party and third persons.' 67 The majority of in-
fluential collateral source cases in Illinois rely on this justification. 168
However, in this instance, the Illinois Supreme Court focused on the
"other relations" language for the first time, and in doing so, it held
that the rule was clearly intended to cover the relationship between
government-funded healthcare and beneficiaries of those programs. 69
Although this interpretation of the rule seems clear, the Illinois courts
have never focused on this aspect of the rule prior to this case.
It is important to note that the Illinois Supreme Court did not ex-
actly adopt the reasonable-value approach as it is described in this
Note. 170 The court essentially adopted an approach whereby the col-
lateral source rule applies to Medicare and Medicaid in the same man-
ner that it does to private insurance. 171 Thus, under the Illinois
Supreme Court's approach, the plaintiff receives the full reasonable
value of the medical expenses, but the amount paid by the govern-
ment programs is still rendered inadmissible-whereas in the typical
reasonable-value approach, evidence of such amounts is admissible to
determine "reasonableness. ' 172
IV. ANALYSIS
This Part analyzes Wills and the applicability of the collateral source
rule to Medicare and Medicaid. 173 Section A critiques and analyzes
the appellate court's opinion in Wills.174 Section B argues that the
166. Id. at 1031.
167. Id. (quoting Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847 (Ill. 2005)).
168. See, e.g., Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 850; Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 524 (Ill.
1989).
169. Compare Wills, 892 N.E.2d at 1030-31, with Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 850, and Wilson, 546
N.E.2d at 530.
170. See Wills, 892 N.E. 2d at 1031. Although the Illinois Supreme Court uses the "reasona-
ble-value" label, this Note describes that approach as one which applies the collateral source rule
in the same manner to Medicare and Medicaid as it does to private insurance. Compare id. at
1029-31 (adopting an approach whereby the plaintiff is entitled to recover the reasonable value
of her medical expenses, but the defendant is not permitted to submit evidence of the actual
amount paid for those medical services), with supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
171. Wills, 892 N.E.2d at 1031.
172. Id.
173. See infra notes 176-238 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 176-195 and accompanying text.
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Illinois Supreme Court erred in overturning the appellate court and
explains the appropriate analysis for determining that the collateral
source rule should not apply to Medicare and Medicaid benefits in the
same manner that it does to private insurance.175
A. Rationale and Sufficiency of the Appellate Opinion in Wills
The appellate decision in Wills turned on the majority's determina-
tion of which Illinois Supreme Court case, Arthur or Peterson, was
more factually similar to the case before the court. The court ex-
plained that "[b]ecause the Arthur court did not specifically overrule
Peterson, we must continue to follow Peterson as it is the case more
factually similar to the case sub judice."'1 76 Consistent with this view,
the Wills appellate court held that the plaintiff could not recover more
than the amount paid by Medicare and Medicaid because she received
her treatment at no cost to her, just like the plaintiff in Peterson.177
While the court's reliance on the Illinois Supreme Court cases is not
unfounded, this limited analysis prevented the court from determining
whether the collateral source rule should apply to these benefits based
on the arguments underlying the rule itself.
Despite the majority's reliance on stare decisis, it stated the rule
correctly and provided several of the rule's primary supporting argu-
ments. 178 Specifically, the court recognized that the collateral source
rule is justified as a deterrent to tortfeasors and that it will typically
not violate the policy opposing double recoveries because the insurer
will have a lien or subrogation right on the plaintiff's award or settle-
ment.179 After noting that the Restatement (Second) of Torts cites
deterrence as a justification for the collateral source rule, however,
the court never again mentioned this purpose in its opinion. 180
Though the court properly concluded that the collateral source rule
does not apply to Medicare and Medicaid, the court never fully ad-
dressed the deterrence purpose of the rule, a purpose that the court
itself noted as a traditional justification for refusing to admit evidence
of collateral sources. 181
175. See infra notes 196-238 and accompanying text.
176. Wills v. Foster, 867 N.E.2d 1223, 1227 (I11. App. Ct. 2007), rev'd, 892 N.E.2d 1018 (I11.
2008).
177. Id. at 1228.
178. See id. at 1226-27.
179. Id. at 1226.
180. Id.
181. See id.
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The appellate opinion also addressed the double recovery and sub-
rogation aspects of the collateral source rule. 182 At the outset, the
court stated that this rule is an exception to the general prohibition of
double recoveries in Illinois, but in the majority of cases, even when
the collateral source rule applies, the plaintiff will not be overcompen-
sated because the insurer's subrogation right will decrease the plain-
tiff's award. 83 The court, however, recognized that for collateral
payments made pursuant to Medicare or Medicaid, the hospitals that
provide services to the plaintiff will not have a right of subrogation. 184
Therefore, in contrast to the situation associated with private insur-
ance, if the collateral source rule applied to these benefits, a plaintiff
would likely receive a double recovery in violation of Illinois's general
prohibition of such a result.185 Furthermore, the appellate court im-
plied that the existence of a subrogation right was the key fact that
distinguished Wills from Arthur:
In effect, the Arthur holding created what seemed to be a windfall
in favor of the plaintiff. We discern that the primary reason for such
a holding was the existence of the insurance contract. This would
explain the justification for allowing an apparent windfall for the
plaintiff-a concept that had been earlier rejected in Peterson. Per-
haps the Arthur court presumed the insurance company would en-
force a subrogation lien. 186
Although the court used subrogation as a distinguishing element of its
analysis, the majority's opinion was primarily based on the benefit-of-
the-bargain justification of the collateral source rule. 8 7 Generally,
this argument justifies the collateral source rule when dealing with
benefits a plaintiff receives from a third party with whom she con-
tracted with on her own behalf.188 A court relying on this justification
will allow a plaintiff to recover more than the discounted amount paid
by her insurer because such a recovery, in a sense, allows the plaintiff
to receive the benefit of her efforts to secure the insurance.1 89
The Wills appellate court, however, consistently referred to the ben-
efit-of-the-bargain justification while focusing on the plaintiff's ex-
182. Wills, 867 N.E.2d at 1226, 1228.
183. Id. at 1226.
184. Id. at 1228 (noting that under 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13 (2004), healthcare providers
have agreed that acceptance of payments from Medicare and Medicaid constitutes full satisfac-
tion of the provider's fees, which prevents the provider from seeking reimbursement of any
additional amounts from the patient).
185. See id.
186. Id. at 1226-27 (internal citation omitted).
187. See id. at 1227.
188. See Zorogastua, supra note 33, at 491-95.
189. Id
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penditures relating to the benefits received, rather than the bargain
itself.190 The court failed to address any argument that "bargained
for" could be read in a broader sense to include more than considera-
tion in the form of monthly premium payments or other expenditures
more commonly associated with private insurance. Moreover, the
court failed to consider that a focus on expenditures for the benefit-of-
the-bargain justification would ultimately lead to the conclusion that
only some Medicare and Medicaid recipients would be limited to re-
covering the amount paid by these governmental programs. The prac-
tical result of the Wills appeallate court's holding-which indicates
that the plaintiff's expenditures are the key factor for determining
whether or not it can recover the full amount of its medical bills-is
that only some, not all, of the beneficiaries of these programs would
be prohibited from recovering the full amount of their bills.191 Con-
sidering the court's discussion of the importance of subrogation rights
when dealing with the collateral source rule, and the fact that the sub-
rogation rights would be the same with all the Medicare programs, it is
unlikely that the court intended this result.192
In light of the numerous arguments both for and against the collat-
eral source rule, it is clear that the appellate opinion in Wills was not a
comprehensive assessment of this rule in the context of Medicare and
Medicaid. The opinion notes three of the main purposes behind the
collateral source rule: deterrence, subrogation rights, and the benefit-
of-the-bargain justification.' 93 The distinction from Arthur on the
grounds of subrogation is a well-founded argument, but the majority's
conclusion is based primarily on a limited interpretation of the bene-
fit-of-the-bargain approach. 194 In addition, the majority failed to ad-
dress the deterrence argument or the compensation principles that
further support its position, and it omitted any discussion of the policy
of awarding a windfall for the plaintiff as opposed to the tortfeasor.
190. Wills, 867 N.E.2d at 1227 ("[T]he justification for the rule was the ideal that the 'wrong-
doer should not benefit from the expenditures made by the injured party in procuring insurance
coverage."' (quoting Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 392 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1979))). "With-
out an expenditure, liability, or obligation on the plaintiff's part, application of the [collateral
source] rule was not justified." Id. "Akin to the plaintiff in Peterson, those individuals . . .
covered by Medicaid or Medicare do not make 'expenditures' and have not bargained for their
coverage." Id. at 1228.
191. See Zorogastua, supra note 33, at 491-95. The appellate court's approach would treat
Medicare beneficiaries differently, because although the beneficiaries of Part A do not pay for
their coverage, those of Parts B, C, and D pay some monthly expenditure for their coverage. See
supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
192. See Wills, 867 N.E.2d at 1226.
193. Id. at 1226-27.
194. See id. at 1225-28.
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Nonetheless, considering some of the more unpersuasive arguments
posed by the dissent, it is clear how the majority opinion reached its
result.195
B. Proposed Analysis for the Application of the Collateral
Source Rule to Medicare and Medicaid
The appellate court's ultimate conclusion in Wills was correct, but
the court's opinion failed to fully address the arguments both for and
against the application of the collateral source rule to Medicare and
Medicaid. In determining whether the collateral source rule should
apply to Medicare and Medicaid, the supreme court should have re-
viewed the justifications behind this rule, compared them with the ar-
guments opposing the application of this rule, and then determined
how the balance of these arguments mandated its conclusion.
This Section outlines the correct approach the Illinois Supreme
Court should have taken by analyzing five main arguments associated
with this issue. First, this Section discusses three traditional justifica-
tions for the collateral source rule: (1) deterring tortious conduct;196
(2) favoring a windfall for the plaintiff over a credit to the
tortfeasor;197 and (3) allowing the plaintiff to receive the benefit of her
bargain. 198 This Section then analyzes two aspects of damages that
contrast the arguments in support of the collateral source rule: the
purpose of compensatory damages1 99 and the prohibition against
double recovery.20° Finally, this Section concludes that the Illinois Su-
preme Court erred in overturning Wills on appeal.
1. Deterrence of Tortious Conduct
A traditional argument in support of the collateral source rule is the
principle that refusing to offset a plaintiff's damages by amounts paid
by independent third parties helps deter tortious conduct. 201 As
stated by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, "The idea behind the
collateral-benefits doctrine ... is that damages measured by the injury
are essential to deterrence. ' 20 2 While an analysis of case law reveals
that deterrence has not been the primary motivating factor behind the
195. See id. at 1228-29; supra note 143.
196. See infra notes 201-206 and accompanying text.
197. See infra notes 207-211 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 212-220 and accompanying text.
199. See infra notes 221-223 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 224-238 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., U.S. Can Co. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 2001); Zorogastua, supra
note 33, at 476-77; SHAVELL, supra note 93, §§ 6.67, 10.3.
202. U.S. Can Co., 254 F.3d at 631.
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collateral source rule in Illinois,203 courts have relied on this rationale
in other jurisdictions,20 4 and, for that reason, it is relevant to the deter-
mination of whether the rule should apply to Medicare and Medicaid.
The implication of the deterrence argument is that tortfeasors will
be dissuaded-in fact, deterred-from acting negligently if they are
required to pay the full amount of the expenses a healthcare provider
charges for services it renders as a result of the tortfeasors' conduct.
As with most deterrence arguments, the actual effect on negligent
conduct depends on the awareness of the potential tortfeasor.205 If a
potential tortfeasor is aware of the amount of damages she would be
required to pay as a result of acting negligently, that knowledge could
deter her wrongful conduct. However, if that tortfeasor is unaware of
the costs she would incur or simply does not think of such costs prior
to acting, she would not be deterred by the impending costs of her
conduct. With respect to the benefits involved in this case, the appro-
priate questions are simple. First, does refusing to allow a tortfeasor a
setoff in damages for the amounts paid by Medicare and Medicaid
actually deter negligent conduct? Second, does forcing the defendant
to pay the full amount of medical expenses billed to the plaintiff,
rather than the amount actually paid by the government, deter that
specific defendant?
The deterrence argument is a difficult one to address in this situa-
tion because any belief in the deterrent effect of the collateral source
rule is dependant on the presumptions of the subjective beliefs of the
potential torteasors. In other words, the answers to these deterrence
questions depend on the extent to which one thinks that potential
tortfeasors contemplate the actual cost of their conduct before acting
negligently. It is difficult to conclusively determine how much the
value of damages deters conduct. Nonetheless, when considering the
fact scenarios at issue here, it is hard to believe that refusing to offset
damages would provide additional deterrence to negligent conduct. A
driver is not likely to think about the age or Medicare eligibility of a
potential plaintiff while driving down the road. Therefore, even if a
person were aware that she would not have to pay the full value of
medical bills if she injured a Medicare-eligible individual, such knowl-
edge would not likely affect her conduct one way or another.
203. See Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Ill. 2005) (noting that the justification for the
collateral source rule is that a defendant should not benefit from the injured party's
expenditures).
204. See Zorogastua, supra note 33, at 476-77 (providing that deterrence and accountability
are the primary justifications for the collateral source rule in Kansas, a state in which the rule has
been criticized and abrogated in part by the legislature).
205. SCHAVELL, supra note 93, § 6.67.
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Furthermore, even with respect to deterrence of specific defend-
ants, a defendant who is forced to pay the additional write-off amount
is not likely to be more deterred than one who is not required to pay
that amount. After all, these cases deal with only a small part of the
total damage award, so an offset for the write-off amounts will not
have a large impact on the total amount awarded to the plaintiff. Al-
though this argument is inconclusive, its importance is further less-
ened in Illinois because courts have consistently referred to the
collateral source rule without noting any deterrence principles sup-
porting its application. 206 Therefore, the ultimate conclusion on the
applicability of the collateral source rule to Medicare and Medicaid
can be determined by simply addressing the two most common justifi-
cations used in Illinois, in addition to the general principles of com-
pensatory damages. In a sense, the deterrence factor does not cut
strongly for either side, but, nevertheless, this decision can be suffi-
ciently supported without conclusive evidence of the actual deterrence
effect of the collateral source rule-evidence which in all likelihood
does not exist.
2. Favoring a Plaintiff over the Tortfeasor When Confronted with
an Inevitable Windfall
The windfall justification for the collateral source rule is based on
policy. According to this argument, the collateral source rule prevents
a tortious party from reducing the plaintiff's damages, because to al-
low such a reduction would amount to an undeserved benefit to the
wrongdoer.20 7 Essentially, this justification presumes that a windfall is
inevitable in situations involving collateral source payments. If the
plaintiff is allowed to recover in excess of the collateral payments, she
would receive a windfall. Conversely, if the defendant is not required
to pay the full amount of the damages, she would receive a windfall
from the relief of payment. The Northern District of Illinois stated
this principle:
In a sense any answer to the collateral source question in the typical
personal injury case can be viewed as a kind of windfall. To a plain-
tiff the money from the collateral source, plus the receipt of undi-
minished damages from the tortfeasor defendant, represents a
double recovery. Conversely, to allow a defendant to reduce his or
her damages liability by the amount plaintiff has already received
206. See, e.g., Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 851; Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 524, 530
(II1. 1989); Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 392 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Il1. 1979), overruled by
Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018 (Il1. 2008); Lopez v. Morley, 817 N.E.2d 592, 598 (Il. App. Ct.
2004); First Midwest Trust Co. v. Rogers, 701 N.E.2d 1107, 1118 (Il. App. Ct. 1998).
207. See State Sec. Ins. Co. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 109 F.R.D. 95. 96 (N.D. I11. 1985).
[Vol. 58:789
WILLS V. FOSTER
from the collateral source would mean the tortfeasor has escaped
paying for all the harm caused by his or her wrong.208
Illinois courts have consistently applied the collateral source rule and
allowed the plaintiff to potentially receive a windfall because, as a
matter of public policy, it is better to allow a plaintiff to receive a
windfall than for the court to reduce the liability in favor of the
wrongdoer.2 09
A number of critiques become apparent when considering the wind-
fall justification for the collateral source rule and how this justification
applies to Medicare and Medicaid. The primary critique, however, is
that the basic presumption of an inevitable windfall is misplaced.
Courts relying on this justification believe that requiring an offset in
damages would amount to a windfall for the defendant. 210 However,
requiring the defendant to pay an amount equal to that which was
actually received by the healthcare provider would not amount to a
windfall in the defendant's favor. From a general standpoint of com-
pensation, the only entity entitled to the difference between the
amount paid and the amount charged is the healthcare provider itself.
The entity is not allowed to recover that amount because it must ac-
cept the Medicare and Medicaid payments as payments in full-it
does not have the right to contract for that right as would a private
insurer.211 If the healthcare provider has no right to recover that
amount, a court's refusal to require a defendant to pay that amount
would not result in a windfall. After all, the only damages at issue
here are those for medical expenses, and the presumption of a wind-
fall is therefore misplaced. It is important to note that the Wills hold-
ing has no effect on damages for pain and suffering, emotional
distress, or punitive damages; this issue simply affects damages related
to medical expenses. When a plaintiff has no out-of-pocket pecuniary
loss requiring compensation, refusing to require a defendant to pay
damages to represent such an amount does not result in a windfall
benefit to that party. Thus, the windfall justification for the collateral
source rule does not support the application of the rule to Medicare
and Medicaid write-offs.
208. Id. at 96.
209. See id.; Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 852 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt.
b (1979)); Wilson, 546 N.E.2d at 530-31; Lopez, 817 N.E.2d at 598; First Midwest Trust Co., 701
N.E.2d at 1118.
210. See, e.g., Arthur, 833 N.E.3d at 852 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A
cmt. b (1979)).
211. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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3. Benefit-of-the-Bargain Justification for the Collateral Source Rule
The primary justification for the collateral source rule in Illinois is
the benefit-of-the-bargain approach. 212 The Illinois Supreme Court
has stated that "[t]he justification for this rule is that the wrongdoer
should not benefit from the expenditures made by the injured party or
take advantage of contracts or other relations that may exist between
the injured party and third persons. '213 In fact, the courts in Peterson,
Arthur, and Wills primarily relied on this justification. 21 4
Applying the benefit-of-the-bargain justification to collateral bene-
fits paid by Medicare and Medicaid would lead to the result that bene-
ficiaries of Medicare and Medicaid would be treated differently. The
benefit-of-the-bargain approach justifies allowing a plaintiff to recover
in excess of the amount paid by her insurer because, by contracting
with that insurer and paying monthly premiums, the plaintiff bar-
gained for that coverage. 21 5 In Arthur, the situation was identical to
that in Wills-the insurance company paid a discounted amount as
payment in full for the plaintiff's healthcare-but the plaintiff's pri-
vate insurance company made the collateral payments pursuant to her
insurance contract.216 Therefore, this justification supported the Ar-
thur court's decision to allow the plaintiff to recover the full amount
charged by the healthcare provider. The court explained that the
"plaintiff did not receive a discount from the provider. Rather, plain-
tiff received the benefit of her bargain with her insurance company-
full coverage for incurred medical expenses."'21 7
Similar to the plaintiff in Arthur, Medicare recipients for Parts B, C,
and D all make some sort of expenditures to obtain coverage. 218
However, Medicare beneficiaries of Part A and Medicaid benefi-
ciaries in Illinois do not incur expenses or contract to receive medical
coverage-it is provided to them free of charge. 219 Therefore, a true
application of the benefit-of-the-bargain approach would require
212. See Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 852; Wilson, 546 N.E.2d at 530; 11 ILL. JUR. Personal Injury &
Torts § 5:63 (2002).
213. Wilson, 546 N.E.2d at 530.
214. Id.; Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 852; Wills v. Foster, 867 N.E.2d 1223, 1225 (II. App. Ct. 2007),
rev'd, 892 N.E.2d 1018 (Il. 2008).
215. See Wilson, 546 N.E.2d at 530; see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 252 (1987) (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.13 (3d ed. 1986)).
216. See Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 853.
217. Id.
218. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, supra note 58.
219. See id.; supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 58:789
WILLS V. FOSTER
courts to limit recoveries to the amount paid for all Medicaid benefi-
ciaries, but only for Part A beneficiaries of Medicare.
An additional basic principle of Illinois law supports the appellate
decision in Wills-a plaintiff is not allowed to recover the cost of ser-
vices that are rendered to her free of charge.220 While this distinction
may seem minimal, it is significant in light of compensation. When an
individual contracts with an insurer and pays premiums in considera-
tion for full medical coverage, that party should receive the benefit of
its bargain and get that coverage. Moreover, if the insurance company
bargains with the healthcare provider and receives a discount, the
plaintiff should still be allowed to recover exactly what she paid her
premiums to receive-full coverage. However, when the plaintiff is
cared for by a healthcare provider free of charge, and that healthcare
provider is required by law to accept any payment from the govern-
ment as full compensation for the services it renders, allowing the
plaintiff to recover more than the amount paid leads to a result in
which the plaintiff essentially profits from the judgment while the gov-
ernment incurs the expenses and the healthcare provider is under-
compensated.
Although the benefit-of-the-bargain approach, which is the primary
justification for the collateral source rule in Illinois, supports the ap-
pellate court's holding in Wills, the most persuasive and important jus-
tifications for holding that the collateral source rule should not apply
to Medicare and Medicaid lie in the purpose of compensatory dam-
ages and the prohibition against double recovery.
4. Purpose of Compensatory Damages
Although deterrence, accountability, potential windfalls, and bar-
gaining benefits all play a role in determining whether the collateral
source rule applies to Medicare and Medicaid, it is important to re-
member that the damages involved only relate to compensation.
22 1
These damages should be limited to the amount required to compen-
sate; they should not be awarded to punish the defendant.22 2 How-
ever, the collateral source rule by its very nature seems to consist of
punitive aspects. If the plaintiff has already received payments that
compensate her for her loss, there is no reason to require the defen-
dant to duplicate that compensation unless such a requirement fulfills
a policy intended to deter or punish. A tortfeasor guilty of nothing
more than negligence should not be required to pay compensatory
220. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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damages that do more than compensate the plaintiff for her loss. To
require such a payment would violate the very purpose of the dam-
ages themselves. 223 In sum, when a plaintiff's medical expenses are
paid by the government at no cost to her, the plaintiff has no loss and,
therefore, any amount the defendant must pay to the plaintiff in ex-
cess of those expenses is not compensatory.
5. Prohibition Against Double Recovery
When the Supreme Court in Wills required the defendant to pay the
full amount of the medical expenses charged by the healthcare pro-
vider, the plaintiff received a double recovery-her expenses were
covered once by the government and a second time by the defendant.
Illinois law is well established in the nature of double recoveries, and
it is clear that the plaintiff's award in this case is wholly in violation of
public policy. 224 The policy in Illinois is that a plaintiff should be lim-
ited to recovering only once for her loss. 225 This principle seems intui-
tive, but at a time when insurance plays a role in a majority of cases,
the application of this policy to other situations can be complicated. 226
When an injured plaintiff whose expenses are covered entirely by
her insurance carrier brings a personal injury action against a negli-
gent third party to recover those expenses, the application of the pol-
icy becomes unclear. Ideally, the negligent party would pay the full
amount of the expenses and the party that actually incurs the cost
would receive that amount from the negligent party.227 This result
could be reached in a couple of ways. The court could simply require
the defendant to pay the full amount of the expenses and have the
insurance carrier be subrogated to that award to the full extent of the
amounts it paid to the provider. 228 Alternatively, the court could re-
fuse to allow the plaintiff to recover the amount paid by the insurance
223. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979) (stating that purpose of compensa-
tory damages is to compensate the plaintiff, not punish the wrongdoer).
224. See Wills v. Foster, 867 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (I11. App. Ct. 2007), rev'd, 892 N.E.2d 1018 (Ill.
2008); Muranyi v. Turn Verein Frisch-Auf, 719 N.E.2d 366, 369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
225. See Wills, 867 N.E.2d at 1226; Muranyi, 719 N.E.2d at 369.
226. See ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 3.1 (2d ed.
1996) (discussing insurance subrogation rights in general, and how, in the absence of legislative
provisions or contractual rights, courts will look to their concern about potential over-compensa-
tion when determining whether to allow a legal right to subrogation).
227. See SHAVELL, supra note 93, § 10.3.3; HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 226, § 3.1 (stating
that subrogation is "an important technique for serving the ends of justice by placing the eco-
nomic responsibility for injuries on the party whose fault caused the loss without also allowing a
recovery by the injured person from both an insurer and the tortfeasor that would violate the
principle of indemnification").
228. See SHAVELL, supra note 93, § 10.3.3; HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 226, § 3.1.
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company, and provide that company with a right to sue on its own
accord to recover for the expenses it incurred. 229 Currently, the gen-
eral practice of insurance companies is to include subrogation rights in
their contracts to ensure that they are compensated for their expenses
if negligent third parties cause the beneficiaries' injuries. 230 In the
case of Medicare and Medicaid, however, while the government has a
subrogation right provided by law, the healthcare provider cannot re-
cover for the difference between the amount paid by the government
and the amount it originally charged.231 Neither of the above options
reaches the ideal result because the provider does not have a subroga-
tion right for the written off amount. Thus, the question becomes
whether the plaintiff should be allowed to recover the full amount
charged by the healthcare provider when, in light of the write-off, at
least part of the amount becomes profit for the plaintiff.
Some jurisdictions automatically subtract the amounts paid by the
insurance company from the injured party's damage award.232 In fact,
the United States is one of few countries in the world that does not, as
a general rule, subtract amounts of collateral sources directly from the
plaintiff's award. 233 This practice would likely reduce the amount of
personal injury cases because, strangely, the law would require a
plaintiff to actually incur some expense to be compensated for its
"loss."234
In light of the five aspects of this issue detailed above, it is apparent
that in holding that the collateral source rule does not apply to Medi-
care and Medicaid, the Illinois Appellate Court came to a conclusion
that is more consistent with Illinois law than the alternative approach
adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court. 235 If Illinois were a jurisdic-
tion in which the collateral source rule were based on principles of
229. See SHAVELL, supra note 93, § 10.3.4.
230. See id.
231. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
232. See SHAVELL, supra note 93, at 239; Jamie Benidickson, Canadian Developments in
Health Care Liability and Compensation, in LAW REFORM AND MEDICAL INJURY LITIGATION 23
(Sheila A.M. Mclean ed., 1995) (describing a case from the Supreme Court of Canada in which
the court examined the relationship of collateral benefits to recoverable tort damages and re-
formed the law to require reduction of plaintiffs' damages in light of collateral benefits).
233. See SHAVELL, supra note 93, at 239.
234. See id.
235. The general policy in Illinois is that a plaintiff can recover only once for its loss. See Wills
v. Foster, 867 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), rev'd, 892 N.E.2d 1018 (Ill. 2008); Muranyi
v. Turn Verein Frisch-Auf, 719 N.E.2d 366, 369 (Il. App. Ct. 1999). The main justification for the
collateral source rule in Illinois focuses on the expenditures of the plaintiff to secure the collat-
eral benefits. See Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 852 (II. 2005); Wilson v. Hoffman Group,
Inc., 546 N.E.2d 524, 530 (Ill. 1989); 11 ILL. JUR. Personal Injury & Torts § 5:63 (1996). In Illi-
nois, a plaintiff is precluded from recovering for medical services that were rendered free of
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deterrence and accountability, the supreme court would have a
stronger argument for concluding that the rule should apply to Medi-
care and Medicaid. 236 However, the primary justification in Illinois is
based on the plaintiff's expenditures and bargains. 237 Because this
justification recognizes that the defendant should not benefit from ex-
penditures or contracts the plaintiff has made with third parties, the
collateral source rule should not apply to Medicare and Medicaid re-
cipients who receive coverage without incurring expenses or obliga-
tions, and without bargaining for their benefits.
The Illinois Supreme Court should have relied on the justifications
specifically noted in Illinois, analyzed the relevant aspects associated
with the application of this rule to Medicare and Medicaid, and ulti-
mately affirmed the appellate court holding that the plaintiff is limited
to recovering the amount paid by the government. Moreover, the
most compelling justification for the appellate court's holding is based
on the law of compensation. Any amount a defendant is required to
pay which recognizes a charge that was written off-and unrecover-
able-on account of Medicare or Medicaid is not an amount that com-
pensates the plaintiff.238 Thus, courts should not allow a plaintiff to
recover that amount under a veil of compensation. In fact, if a court
were faced with deciding the recoverability of medical charges written
off by the providers, for both private insurance and governmental
healthcare, the purpose of compensatory damages would mandate
that no plaintiff be allowed to recover such an amount if the health-
care provider did not have a subrogation right that would allow it to
eventually receive the full value of the services it charged. Without
such a subrogation right, the plaintiff profits from laws based on
compensation.
V. IMPACT
The most obvious impact Wills will have on personal injury cases in
Illinois relates to damages. In Wills, the appellate court essentially
removed the potential for plaintiffs covered by Medicare and Medi-
caid to recover an amount of compensatory damages in excess of that
which was actually paid to the healthcare provider. 239 By reversing
charge. See Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 392 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1979), overruled by
Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018 (Ill. 2008).
236. See Zorogastua, supra note 33, at 476-77.
237. See Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 847.
238. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979) (describing the purpose of compen-
satory damages).
239. Wills, 867 N.E.2d at 1223.
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the lower court's opinion, the Illinois Supreme Court eliminated this
limitation, and now these plaintiffs can receive a value of compensa-
tory damages that "compensates" them for an expense that neither
they, nor the government, ever paid.
The impact of Wills depends on the size and reach of the govern-
mental programs themselves. The Illinois Medicaid program currently
provides assistance to approximately 2.2 million people per year.240
For the fiscal year of 2007, this program provided assistance in excess
of eight billion dollars.241 According to the Illinois Department of
Healthcare and Family Services, the state provided aid for benefi-
ciaries who were serviced by a monthly average of 53,153 healthcare
providers. 242 In total, the 2006 estimated population of Illinois was
approximately 12.8 million.243 Assuming that these statistics are accu-
rate, that means that approximately sixteen percent of Illinois re-
sidents received Medicaid benefits in 2007. Although it is unlikely
that the percentage of personal injury plaintiffs covered by Medicaid
and Medicare would mirror this number, even if it is relatively close, a
large number of cases would be affected by the Wills decision.
These simple statistics make the potential effect of Wills apparent
with respect to damages, but it is also significant to note how this
holding may additionally affect personal injury suits in Illinois. Wills
will have the additional effect of increasing the incentive to bring per-
sonal injury suits in the first place. If plaintiffs' compensatory dam-
ages are not limited to the amount paid by the government-as Wills
so holds-injured parties will have additional incentive to bring suit,
knowing that they could at least recover some value for the full cost of
their medical care. Consider the hypothetical discussed in the intro-
duction, in which a woman is injured in an automobile accident due to
a negligent driver, and assume that her hospital bills for that injury
total $100,000.244 Moreover, assume that she is covered by Medicare
and Medicaid and that these programs settle the hospital's bill for
240. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE AND FAMILY SERVICES, ANNUAL REPORT
(2007), available at http://www.hfs.illinois.gov/annualreport (stating that the program provides
aid to 2.2 million people, including 1.3 million children, 509,000 parents, 150,000 seniors, and
240,000 persons with disabilities). In addition to those receiving Medicaid, there are a number of
individuals in Illinois who receive Medicare benefits from the federal government. However,
because the qualifying criteria of the programs is nearly identical, it is likely that the individuals
who receive Medicaid from Illinois are the same ones who receive benefits from Medicare, so
any Medicare statistics would overlap and were excluded from this Section.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. U.S. Census Bureau, IllinoisQuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17000.
html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
244. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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$50,000. In this situation, if the potential defendant-driver is guilty of
nothing more than negligence, the injured woman could bring suit,
recover $100,000 for compensatory damages, have the government re-
cover $50,000 of that reward pursuant to its subrogation rights, and
retain the remaining $50,000. This remainder is neither compensation
for her pain and suffering nor punishment for the defendant's con-
duct, but rather a compensatory payment for medical expenses that
were never paid, expenses for which the hospital will never receive
repayment.
Under the Illinois Appellate Court's approach in Wills, absent a
claim for pain and suffering, emotional distress, lost wages, or punitive
damages, the plaintiff in the above situation would recover $50,000 in
medical expenses, all of which would go to the party that actually paid
those expenses-the party that needs to be compensated. If this were
the situation, what incentive would there be to bring suit?
This hypothetical raises an important question: does the appellate
court's approach lead to a fair result? This question highlights several
issues discussed in this Note. From a perspective of deterrence, per-
haps this result is unfair; the negligent party did not have to pay the
full value of the medical care the plaintiff received. From a compensa-
tion perspective, however, this result is fair because the plaintiff has
no pecuniary loss, and without a loss, there is nothing to compensate.
Illinois's public policies can be used to support both sides of this argu-
ment-Illinois disfavors double recoveries 245 but also aims to deter
negligent conduct. 246 Thus, the law in Illinois does not provide a deci-
sive answer to this question.
Under the Illinois Supreme Court's holding in Wills, the plaintiff in
our hypothetical would recover the full $100,000 for compensatory
damages and, thus, would stand to make a considerable profit by re-
covering damages intended to compensate her for her loss. Is this a
result that compensation entails? Illinois should not allow plaintiffs to
profit from personal injury suits under a veil of compensation. The
Wills appellate court correctly responded to these issues, and in deter-
mining whether to affirm the appellate court's decision, the Illinois
Supreme Court should have analyzed the issues above and reached
the same conclusion. The courts of this state should not allow plain-
tiffs to receive compensatory damages that do more than
compensate .247
245. See Muranyi v. Turn Verein Frisch-Auf, 719 N.E.2d 366 369 (I1. App. Ct. 1999).
246. See U.S. Can Co. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 2001).
247. See Wills v. Foster, 867 N.E.2d 1223, 1228 (Il1. App. Ct. 2007), rev'd, 892 N.E.2d 1018 (Ill.
2008).
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If the Illinois Supreme Court had affirmed Wills on appeal, its hold-
ing could have had the effect of reducing the potential recoveries of
plaintiffs covered by private insurance, as well. The primary justifica-
tion for the collateral source rule in Illinois-the benefit-of-the-bar-
gain approach-works to distinguish the application of this rule to
governmental healthcare from that of private insurance.248 The gen-
eral principles of compensation underlying the analysis in this Note,
however, would likely lead to an additional conclusion-that plaintiffs
covered by private insurance should be limited to recovering the
amounts paid by their insurance carriers and should not be able to
recover any amounts "written off" by the healthcare provider. But
such a result would be consistent with Wills only if the healthcare pro-
vider contracted away its right to subrogation on the plaintiff's claim.
The trial court in Wills provided a procedural approach to its decision
that would be flexible enough to account for such potential case-by-
case fluctuations. 249 The court did not allow the defendant to submit
evidence of the Medicare and Medicaid payments during trial, and the
court did not decrease the plaintiff's award until the defendant filed a
post-trial motion.250 If the Illinois Supreme Court had affirmed Wills
and agreed with this procedure, judges would have been allowed to
determine, on a case-by-case basis, how the plaintiff's compensatory
damages should be limited, depending on whether any of the health-
care provider's charges were written off and whether the providers
retained subrogation rights therefor. This is the only process that
would allow courts to reach the ideal result in each case, a result that
follows the principles of compensation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The debate over the collateral source rule and its application to
Medicare and Medicaid presents a number of arguments in both law
and in policy. Distinguishing Medicare and Medicaid benefits from
those derived from private insurance agreements ultimately leads to
line drawing that unfairly distinguishes between plaintiffs. In addi-
tion, decreasing the amount of damages a defendant should pay as a
result of negligent conduct could decrease the incentive to conduct
one's self with due care. However, when a plaintiff is allowed to re-
cover damages in the name of compensation, courts should at least
require the plaintiff to show that she has incurred some expense that
248. See supra notes 212-220 and accompanying text.
249. Wills, 867 N.E.2d at 1224.
250. Id. at 1225.
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justifies such an award. If a plaintiff has no pecuniary loss and no
obligation to pay, there are simply no compensatory damages.
Ultimately, an analysis of the collateral source rule, especially the
development of this rule in Illinois, leads to the conclusion that plain-
tiffs like the one in Wills should be limited to recovering no more than
the amount the government paid on their behalf. Any deterrence ar-
gument opposing Wills would have to assume that defendants are
aware of the potential costs associated with their conduct, and in this
instance, would require an assumption that individuals think about
who they are negligently injuring before they act. Such an assumption
cannot be the backbone of this determination. Moreover, any argu-
ment that focuses on favoring the plaintiff over the defendant when
confronted with an inevitable windfall would have to assume that giv-
ing the plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount needed to com-
pensate her for her loss creates a windfall for the defendant. When
considering the nature of compensation and the fact that we are only
dealing with those damages, this assumption is misplaced. In addition,
although the appellate court used the benefit-of-the-bargain approach
to support its decision, such an approach leads to further distinctions
that are unnecessary in this case. When considering the nature of
compensation and the policy in Illinois of allowing a plaintiff to re-
cover only once for her loss, the necessary determination becomes ap-
parent: The Illinois Supreme Court should have affirmed the
appellate court decision and limited compensatory damages for Medi-
care and Medicaid recipients to the amount actually paid by these
governmental entities. To hold otherwise would be to allow compen-
sation when none is due.
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